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Pressing California Shield Law
on Criminal Defendants: A
Weighting Game
by AMY R. BACH*
Introduction
While incursions on freedom of the press are aptly criticized
as having a "chilling effect" on news dissemination, little could
be colder than a jail cell. Newspeople have been incarcerated
after refusing to divulge sources or confidential information in
response to subpoenas.' Defendants have waited in jail while
a newsperson refused to divulge information crucial to their
defense.2
Both the first amendment of the United States Constitution,
and article 1, section 2 of the California Constitution give
newspeople the right to publish information freely.3 In many
states,4 including California, that freedom is further guaran-
teed by "shield laws."5 The term "shield" denotes protection
from being cited for contempt.6 Shield laws offer protection
from subpoenas that would otherwise compel newspeople to
disclose information. However, these laws may also interfere
with the constitutionally-protected right to a fair trial.7
* B.A., Cornell University. Member, Third Year Class. The author dedicates
this Note to newsman Jerry Burns, 1937-1988.
1. In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (1978).
2. North Carolina v. Hagaman, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2525 (N.C. Gen. Ct. J.
1983).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
4. Legislatures have adopted shield laws in 26 states. See THE REPORTERS COM-
MITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES & INFORMATION (1987).
5. California's shield law is contained in CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2, and CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1070 (West 1988).
6. By contrast, sword laws are those that give the press tools to acquire infor-
mation. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
7. Sipos, California's "New" Newsmen's Shield Law and the Criminal Defen-
dant's Right to a Fair Trial, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 219 (1986); Note, The News-
gatherer's Shield--Why Waste Space in the California Constitution, 15 Sw. U.L.
REV. 527 (1985).
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This conflict recently arose in California when reporter Erin
Hallissy declined to answer a subpoena to testify in the trial of
accused murderer John Sapp.' Hallissy v. Superior Court was
the first appellate review of the shield law in a criminal case
since the law was elevated to constitutional status in 1980.9
The Hallissy court recognized that the application of the
shield law in criminal cases involves issues distinct from those
that arise in civil cases. The court reiterated an earlier hold-
ing that "where a criminal defendant has demonstrated a rea-
sonable possibility that evidence sought to be discovered might
result in his exoneration, he is entitled to its discovery." 10 The
court went on to hold that the defendant failed to meet his
burden of demonstrating his need for the reporter's informa-
tion." Shortly after Hallissy, the shield law was tested in an-
other California criminal case.12 In Delaney v. Superior Court,
the California Court of Appeal held that the privilege protect-
ing unpublished information is inapplicable to eyewitness tes-
timony regarding a public event.' 3
This Note examines the impact of the California shield law
on a criminal defendant's fair trial rights. It traces the recent
history of the law through Hallissy. Federal case law on the
subject is also examined.14 The analysis below suggests that a
8. Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988).
9. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. at
635 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
10. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1045, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 638 (quoting Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 24-25, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207, 214
(1984)).
11. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1046, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
12. Delaney v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1988),
reh'g granted, 252 Cal. Rptr. 277, 762 P.2d 441 (1988).
13. Id. at 1030, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 67. A dissenting opinion in Delaney cited the
recent holding in New York Times v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 503, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 426 (1988), in arguing that the shield law makes no distinction between public
and private events. The dissent in Delaney argued that the trial court should have
required that the defendant meet the "reasonable possibility" of exoneration stan-
dard applied in Hallissy before it compelled disclosure. Delaney, 202 Cal. App. 3d at
1032.
14. Federal case law on shield privileges is largely derived from the landmark
ruling in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes
and the Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709 (1975);
Anderson, Branzburg v. Hayes: A Need for Statutory Protection of News Sources, 61
KY. L.J. 551 (1973); Hurst, Has Branzburg Buried the Underground Press?, 8 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 181 (1973); Bennett, Constitutional Law: Branzburg v. Hayes-
Must Newsmen Reveal Their Confidential Sources to Grand Juries?, 8 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 567 (1972); Cullen, Circumventing Branzburg: Absolute Protection for Con-
fidential News Sources, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 615 (1984); Note, Stone Got Caught
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set of standards should be developed to resolve future conflicts
between shield laws and a defendant's right to a fair trial.
These standards should distinguish the application of shield
laws to source protection from their application to unpub-
lished information protection. The standards should also dis-
tinguish civil defendants seeking to compel testimony from
criminal defendants seeking to do the same. This Note pro-
poses that California provide newspeople with qualified immu-
nity from contempt, not an absolute privilege to refuse to
testify. Finally, this Note concludes that defendants facing the
death penalty should be able to overcome the privilege on a
lesser showing that the testimony sought is relevant to their
case.
I
Background of the Conflict
Reporters frequently need to protect their sources and other
unpublished information from public disclosure. Confidential-
ity ensures source security and fosters disclosure of informa-
tion. Sources often disclose information damaging to third
parties who then seek retribution. The potential for retribu-
tive acts poses the risk that disclosure of a source's identity
will expose the source to physical or economic harm. Thus,
because many sources are unwilling to divulge information
without an assurance of anonymity, reporters depend on the
ability to offer such assurance. Newsgathering efforts would
be severely hampered if primary sources of information were
rendered unavailable through forced disclosure of confidential
information.
The freedom to publish, stemming from the first amend-
ment, often depends on a reporter's ability to keep a source or
unpublished information confidential. Although source confi-
dentiality is not specifically protected under the first amend-
ment, it may be accorded protection when necessary to
safeguard legitimate first amendment interests.'" Twenty-six
states currently have some form of shield law.16 Many of
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Grand Juries'Power to Subpoena Outtakes That
Reveal Conjidential News Sources, 10 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 623 (1988) (au-
thored by M. Kassman); Comment, The Newsman's Privilege after Branzburg v.
Hayes; Whither Now?, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 218 (1973).
15. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 681, 710.
16. See infra note 33.
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these laws are the subject of continuing controversy.
A central source of controversy is the possibility that shield
laws will interfere with the constitutionally-protected right to
a fair trial. The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution provide that no citizen shall be de-
prived of life or liberty without due process of the law.'7 A
fair trial is considered to be a due process right.'" The fifth
and sixth amendments provide criminal defendants with spe-
cific rights to ensure a fair trial.'9 Prominent among them is
the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses in one's
favor.20 It is also a settled rule that the public is entitled to
every person's evidence,' and that reporters, like all citizens,
have a duty to respond to all relevant questions.22 A Califor-
nia defendant at a preliminary hearing has the right to pres-
ent witnesses to overcome the prosecution's case or to
establish an affirmative defense.23
Because a fair trial is predicated upon the weighing of all
relevant evidence, a defendant who is denied access to evi-
dence relevant to his or her defense may be deprived of due
process. In Chambers v. Mississippi,2 4 the Supreme Court
held that a criminal defendant has a fundamental right to de-
fend against accusations by confronting and cross-examining
witnesses on his behalf.25 Therefore, when a newsperson as-
serts a shield privilege in response to a subpoena, a criminal
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury
... ; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law."
19. U.S. CONST. amend VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury... ; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
21. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 688.
22. Id. at 682-84.
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 866 (Deering 1985); Jones v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d
660, 667, 483 P.2d 1241, 1246, 94 Cal. Rptr. 289, 293 (1971).
24. In Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), a witness confessed to the
crime with which the defendant had been charged. Because Mississippi evidence
rules prevent cross-examination of the confessing witness, the Supreme Court held
the defendant had been deprived of a fair trial and reversed his conviction.
25. Id at 294.
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defendant's fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendment rights to a
fair trial may be jeopardized. 6
When two such fundamental principles conflict, controversy
is inevitable. The controversy is heightened in California by
differing views on the definition and application of the shield
law. There is currently a debate over whether the California
shield law creates an absolute privilege not to testify, or rather
a qualified immunity from contempt, which may be overcome
upon a showing of necessity." If the law were construed to
provide an absolute privilege, newspeople would have signifi-
cant discretion in deciding when to testify. It is also unclear
whether the California law applies with equal weight to
sources and unpublished information, and whether it can be
invoked with equal force in criminal and civil trials. These is-
sues were raised in Hallissy v. Superior Court.2 Moreover,
Hallissy raised the issue of whether a court should weigh the
matter of disclosure differently when the defendant is facing
the death penalty."
II
The Federal Approach
Current California shield law is derived from the landmark
federal case of Branzburg v. Hayes.30 In Branzburg, the
Supreme Court ruled that journalists do not have a first
amendment right to withhold information or sources from a
grand jury,3' but explicitly invited states to create their own
privileges.32 Twenty-six states accepted the invitation.3
26. Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 535, 522 P.2d 305, 308, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 897, 900 (1974).
27. Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988).
28. Id.
29. The Hallissy court did not address this issue.
30. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
31. Id, at 690.
32. Id at 706.
33. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1986); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-220 (1983 & Supp.
1987); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2214
(Supp. 1986); ARx. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977 & Supp. 1985); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070(Deering 1986 & Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1975 & Supp.
1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 8-901 to 8-909 (Smith-Hurd 1984 & Supp. 1987);
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns 1973 & Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100(Baldwin 1972 & Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-1454 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1987); 14 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1455-1458 (1987); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1984 & Supp. 1986); MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 767.5a (West
1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-
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A. Branzburg v. Hayes
The Branzburg case involved a reporter who had researched
the manufacture and use of hashish in Frankfort, Kentucky.
Reporter Paul Branzburg showed a copy of the Kentucky
shield statute to potential sources to persuade them that he
would not be forced to disclose their identity.14  After
Branzburg's articles on the drug trade were published, he was
subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury.-- He refused to
comply and asserted that he was shielded from a contempt
finding. 6 The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the shield
law could not be invoked by a reporter who was an eyewitness
to a crime.37 The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Branzburg
consists of four opinions, two of which are germane to this dis-
cussion.38 In a plurality opinion, Justice White stressed that
reporters, like all citizens, have a duty to respond to relevant
questions which are put to them during grand jury or criminal
trial proceedings.39 Fair and effective law enforcement was
held to be a fundamental function of government, with such
proceedings integral to that function.40 The Court concluded
that the public interest in law enforcement prevails over any
"burden on news gathering" that may result from insisting
that reporters respond to relevant questions.41 The Branzburg
1-901, 26-1-903 (1985 & Supp. 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144, 20-147 (1983); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (Michie 1983 & Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21
to 21.9, 2A:84A-29 (West 1976 & Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-514 (1986); N.Y.
Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-
06.2 (1976 & Supp. 1987); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (Anderson 1981 &
Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1985); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon 1985 & Supp.
1987); 28 PA. STAT. ANN. § 330 (Purdon 1958 & Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-
1 to 9-19.1-3 (1985 & Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980 & Supp. 1986).
34. The Kentucky shield law provides that "no person shall be compelled to dis-
close in any legal proceeding or trial before any court, or before any grand or petit
jury .... or before the general assembly, or ... legislative body, or any committee
thereof, or elsewhere, the source of any information procured or obtained by him,
and published in a newspaper or by a radio or television broadcasting station by
which he is engaged or employed, or with which he is connected." Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 421.100 (Baldwin 1972 & Supp. 1987).
35. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668.
36. Id
37. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970).
38. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The opinions are Justice White's plurality and Justice
Stewart's dissent. Justice Powell filed a concurrence and Justice Douglas a separate
dissent.
39. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690-91.
40. I at 690.
41. Id at 690-91.
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plurality recognized, however, that "without some [first
amendment] protection for seeking out the news, freedom of
the press could be eviscerated. '" 42
Justice Stewart authored a strong dissent that has since
served as a model for state shield laws.43 He argued that the
first amendment supports the creation of a media privilege,
and that the rule that the state is entitled to "everyman's evi-
dence" is not an absolute one.44 Stewart also pointed out that
the rule has been limited by the fourth and fifth amendments
and by common law evidentiary privileges.45
Justice Stewart argued that a party seeking to compel dis-
closure of privileged materials should have to satisfy a three-
prong test.46 First, the defendant must show probable cause
that the journalist has information clearly relevant to a spe-
cific probable violation of the law. Second, the defendant
must show that there are no alternative means of obtaining
the information less destructive to first amendment rights.
Third, the defendant must demonstrate a compelling and over-
riding interest in disclosure of the information.47
B. Post-Branzburg State Shield Law Activity
The Branzburg plurality opinion concluded that there was
merit in leaving state legislatures free, within first amend-
ment limits, to create their own shield standards.4 The Court
noted that it was "powerless to bar state courts from respond-
ing in their own way and construing their own constitutions so
"149as to recognize a newsman's privilege ....
Most states that currently have some form of shield law pro-
vide identical protection for sources and unpublished informa-
tion.' Some allow greater protection for sources than for
42. Id at 681.
43. Id. at 725. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 8-901 to 8-909 (Smith-Hurd
1984 & Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 11-514 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980 & Supp. 1986).
44. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 737.
45. Id
46. Id at 743.
47. Id
48. Id at 706
49. Id
50. States whose statutes provide identical protection for sources and unpub-
lished information are: Delaware, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Ten-
nessee. See supra note 33.
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unpublished information, but none allow the reverse. 51 Fif-
teen states have laws that have been characterized as "abso-
lute" because they may be asserted without qualification to
protect sources.52 The remaining states provide newspeople
with only a "qualified" source privilege.53 Illinois' shield law,
for example, provides that the source privilege may be over-
come where "other available sources have been exhausted"
and the material is essential to the protection of a public inter-
est.' In Michigan, the privilege may be overcome by a defend-
ant charged with a crime punishable by life imprisonment,
who can show that the material sought is essential and un-
available from an alternative source.m
The scope and nature of state shield laws are frequently liti-
gated. Common controversies include whether the law ex-
tends to freelance reporters,m whether the law protects
sources and unpublished information with equal vigor,57 and
whether both non-confidential and confidential information
are protected. Case law in Indiana is in conflict as to protec-
tion of non-confidential information.' Confidential and non-
confidential sources are equally protected in Illinois59 and in
California.6°
New York's shield law provides journalists with immunity
from contempt for failing to disclose sources or unpublished
51. States whose statutes provide stronger protection for sources than for unpub-
lished information are: Arizona, Minnesota, and Oregon. Case law in other states
contains the same distinction. See supra note 33..
52. States with absolute source protection statutes are: Alabama, Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. See supra note 33.
53. States with qualified source privilege statutes are: Alaska, Arkansas, Illinois,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Is-
land, and Tennessee. See supra note 33.
54. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-907 (Smith-Hurd 1984 & Supp. 1987).
55. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a (West 1982).
56. Freelance writers are not protected in California under In Re Van Ness, 8
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2563 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 1982).
57. A shield law applies only to sources and does not protect outtakes in Arkan-
sas under Williams v. ABC, 96 F.R.D. 658 (W.D. Ark. 1983). In Maryland, a statute
protects only sources, not information, under Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713,
294 A.2d 149 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972). A statute protects unpublished materials as
well as sources in Pennsylvania under In Re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
58. Indiana v. Haak, 417 N.E.2d 321 (Ind. 1983).
59. The Illinois shield statute applies to both confidential and non-confidential
information under People ex. rel Scott v. Silverstein, 89 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 412 N.E.2d
692 (1980).
60. Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979).
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information.61 In Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v. Green-
berg,62 New York's highest court ruled that only a showing of
confidentiality triggers shield law protection.63 This ruling up-
held the prior appellate division decision ordering an Albany,
New York television station to turn over outtakes of an inter-
view with the husband of a missing woman who was subse-
quently found murdered.64 The court held that the shield law
did not protect the station because the materials sought were
not confidential."s Legislation introduced in response to
Knight-Ridder specified that all information is protected by
the shield law "whether communicated confidentially or non-
confidentially."66
III
California's Shield Law
California's shield law is contained in the Evidence Code 7
61. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987).
62. 70 N.Y.2d 151, 511 N.E.2d 1116, 518 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1987).
63. Id at 153, 511 N.E.2d at 1117, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
64. Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v. Greenberg, 119 A.D.2d 68, 13 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1140 (1986).
65. The appellate division of the New York Supreme Court held that the shield
law protected only confidential materials. The court remitted the matter to the
Supreme Court for an in camera inspection to determine whether the disputed
materials were in fact confidential. Id. at 70, 72, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1140.
66. Assem. Bill No. 8603 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.). See also Verhovek, Press Protec-
tion Gains in N.Y, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1989, at A16, col. 1.
67. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1988) provides:
(a) A publisher, editor, reporter or other person connected with or em-
ployed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, or by a
press association .. .cannot be adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legisla-
tive, administrative body, or any other body having the power to issue sub-
poenas, for refusing to disclose ... the source of any information procured
while so connected or employed for publication in a newspaper, magazine or
other periodical publication, or for refusing to disclose any unpublished in-
formation obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of in-
formation for communication to the public.
(b) Nor shall a radio or television news reporter or other person con-
nected with or employed by a radio or television station, or any person who
has been so connected or employed, be so adjudged in contempt for refusing
to disclose the source of any information procured while so connected or
employed for news or news commentary purposes on radio or television, or
for refusing to disclose any unpublished information obtained or prepared
in gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to
the public.
(c) As used in this section, "unpublished information" includes informa-
tion not disseminated to the public by the person from whom disclosure is
sought, whether or not related information has been disseminated and in-
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and the California Constitution." The shield for sources had
been in the Evidence Code since 1935; it was extended in 1974
to protect unpublished information.69 Nearly identical lan-
guage in the Evidence Code and California Constitution pro-
vides publishers, editors, reporters, and others associated with
print, radio, and television media with immunity from con-
tempt for refusing to divulge sources of information or unpub-
lished information in response to a subpoena.70
The Evidence Code provision was elevated to constitutional
status by Proposition 5 in the June 3, 1980 primary election.7'
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court,72 a court of ap-
peal interpreted the constitutionalized shield law and held
that the state constitution is the highest expression of the will
of the people acting in their sovereign capacity and must be
given effect as the paramount law of the state.73 For that rea-
son, this Note will refer to the constitutional provision rather
than to the Evidence Code.
Article 1, section 2(a) of the California Constitution protects
freedom of speech and freedom of the press.74 Under section
2(b), publishers, editors, and reporters cannot be held in con-
tempt for failing to disclose sources or unpublished informa-
tion gathered for public dissemination.75
Article 1, section 2(b) is broadly drafted and ambiguous in
three important areas. First, it draws no distinction between
cases where compelled disclosure is sought by civil, as opposed
cludes, but is not limited to, all notes, outtakes, photographs, tapes or other
dita of whatever sort not itself disseminated to the public through a me-
dium of communication, whether or not published information based upon
or related to such material has been disseminated.
68. CAL. CONST. art I, § 2(b).
69. Stats. 1974, ch. 1323, § 1, p. 2877; Stats. 1974, ch. 1456, § 2, p. 3184.
70. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1988). One differ-
ence between the constitution and the code is that § 2(b) of the constitution states
that publishers, etc., shall not be adjudged in contempt, whereas § 1070 of the Evi-
dence Code uses the word cannot For statutory purposes, this distinction has been
held to be irrelevant. Gleason v. Spray, 81 Cal. 217, 220, 22 P. 551, 552 (1889).
71. Assem. Const. Amend. No. 4, Stats. 1978 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) res. ch. 77, pp.
4819-20.
72. 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1984).
73. Al at 28, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
74. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
75. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b) provides that unpublished information is informa-
tion not disseminated to the public by the person from whom disclosure is sought. It
includes notes, outtakes, photographs, tapes, and other data, regardless of whether
such information has been the basis of published information.
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to criminal defendants.76 Second, it does not distinguish confi-
dential from non-confidential sources. Third, it does not dis-
tinguish cases where disclosure is sought to be compelled from
a party, as opposed to a non-party.77
The issue of parties versus non-parties will not be discussed
in detail in this Note. However, it is notable that contempt is
the standard remedy applied against a non-party witness and
that the California enactments grant non-party witnesses vir-
tually absolute protection against compelled disclosure.78
The California shield law protects both confidential sources
and unpublished information.79 The court of appeal in Ham-
marley v. Superior Court held that shield law protection for
unpublished information was not limited to material which
might lead to disclosure of confidential sources.8 0 Section 2(b)
of the California Constitution provides that newspeople "shall
not be adjudged in contempt" by any judicial, legislative or ad-
ministrative body having the power to issue subpoenas."' This
seemingly unqualified rule does not provide for any balancing
of interests. Nevertheless, in Mitchell v. Superior Court, the
California Supreme Court held that a reporter has only a
qualified privilege to refuse to divulge confidential sources and
unpublished information.12 The scope of that privilege de-
pends upon a balancing of factors in each case, one of which is
protecting confidentiality.8 3  The different results in Ham-
marley and Mitchell illustrate how California's shield law has
received widely divergent judicial treatment."'
A. Hallissy v. Superior Court
Hallissy was decided in April 1988 by the California Court
76. Id
77. Id.
78. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 274, 690 P.2d 625, 628, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 152, 155 (1984).
79. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b).
80. 89 Cal. App. 3d 397, 153 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1979).
81. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b).
82. 37 Cal. 3d at 279, 690 P.2d at 632, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
83. Id. at 279, 690 P.2d at 634, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
84. Less than four months after the California Court of Appeal upheld the privi-
lege in Hallissy, a different division of the court held the privilege inapplicable
where the reporter is an eyewitness to a public event. Delaney v. Superior Court,
202 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1988), reh'g granted, 252 Cal. Rptr. 277, 762
P.2d 441 (1988).
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of Appeal."' John Sapp had been charged with murder under
special circumstances8 with a possible sentence of the death
penalty. 7 For his defense, he attempted to secure notes from
Erin Hallissy, a Contra Costa County Times reporter to whom
he had granted a jailhouse interview.8  The interview, pub-
lished under the headline, "I Killed Many for Pay, Says Sapp,"
appeared on the front page of the Contra Costa County
Times.89 Following publication of the article, an amended
complaint was filed, which contained the added charge that
Sapp committed two murders for financial gain.90 Defense
counsel suggested that the amended complaint, filed in Sep-
tember 1986, was the result of the May 10, 1986 article." De-
fense counsel believed that the unpublished notes would
reveal inconsistencies in statements made by the defendant at
that time and during subsequent conversations with others.9 2
He hoped these inconsistencies would undermine charges that
were based on his client's own statements.9 3
Although the information sought by Sapp was unpublished
and did not involve a confidential or non-confidential source,
Hallissy was willing to go to jail to protect her rights under
California's shield law.94 Furthermore, disclosure of the infor-
mation Sapp was seeking posed no threat to a source and was
unlikely to adversely affect future newsgathering efforts.9 5
Although there was no apparent reason for Hallissy to protect
the information so avidly, the theoretical basis for her position
85. Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988).
86. Sapp was charged with three counts of violating CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187,
189, one count of violating CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12021, 12022.5, and a special circum-
stance pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(1).
87. Sapp was charged with three counts of murder in the first degree. Hallissy,
200 Cal. App. 3d at 1041, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 635. He was also charged with the special
circumstances of multiple murder and murder for financial gain. Id Defendants
convicted of "special circumstance" crimes are subject either to the death penalty or
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id.
88. Id., 248 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
89. Contra Costa Times, May 10, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
90. Hailissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1041, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
91. Attorneys for- Hallissy disputed the suggestion and argued that the district
attorney stated in open court that the murder for hire charge was based on informa-
tion from sources other than Hallissy. See Petitioner's Request for Immediate Stay
at 34, Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 635 (No. A039773).
92. 1&
93. Id
94. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1042, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
95. Id, at 1041-42, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 636 (citing and quoting the August 4, 1987
order of the Contra Costa County Superior Court).
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may have reflected the fact that California's shield law pro-
vides no hierarchy of protection. Therefore, newspeople may
feel that they must defend all information with equal vigor.
On January 20, 1987, Sapp had a subpoena duces tecum is-
sued directing Hallissy to appear at a preliminary examina-
tion. The subpoena ordered her to bring "notes of newspaper
interview with John Sapp ... including, but not limited to
notes, memoranda, tapes of interviews, statements taken at
the time of interviews with John Sapp in 1986." 6 Defense
counsel sought to offer the reporter's notes as circumstantial
evidence of the credibility of his client's statements, in the be-
lief that the charges against him were founded on those
statements.97
The parties argued the motion before Judge Mark B.
Simons in February 1987. The Judge quashed the subpoena
on three grounds:
(1) A defendant's right to discovery prior to the preliminary
examination is limited, and no showing had been made that
the information sought was necessary to prepare for the pre-
liminary examination; (2) the desired testimony would not
elicit relevant and admissible evidence; (3) the defendant
failed to make the showing required to overcome the privilege
deriving from the first amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
and Article 1, Sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the California
Constitution.9
8
In response to Judge Simons' ruling, defense counsel served
a motion to dismiss the charges against Sapp. The motion al-
leged that the defendant's right to call a witness at the prelim-
inary hearing to prepare his defense had been violated when
the municipal court quashed the Hallissy subpoena. It also re-
quested that the case be remanded to the municipal court to
reopen the preliminary hearing for the sole purpose of hearing
testimony from Hallissy.99
The municipal court announced that a hearing would be
held on the defense motions. The court indicated that it
would consider the constitutional claims at that hearing.
Judge Norman Spellberg ruled that, due to the criminal na-
ture of the proceeding, Hallissy did not have standing to inter-
96. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 10.
97. Brief for Real Party in Interest at 10, Hallis ai, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1038, 248
Cal. Rptr. at 635 (No. A039773).
98. Id at 11-12.
99. Id. at 5.
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vene. Hallissy's attorneys were limited to filing briefs as amici
curiae.10o
Following argument, Judge Spellberg overruled Judge
Simons' order quashing the Hallissy subpoena and remanded
the action so that Hallissy's testimony could be included in the
preliminary hearing findings. Although Judge Spellberg's rul-
ing was based on the same three grounds used by Judge
Simons, Judge Spellberg ruled the opposite way on each
ground. 01 First, Spellberg held that California law provides
for extensive discovery prior to a preliminary examination.
Second, he held that Hallissy's testimony was relevant and ad-
missible under the hearsay rule because it would not be of-
fered for the truth of the matter asserted. Finally, he held
that the defendant had made the showing required to over-
come the newsman's privilege in article 1, sections 2(a) and
2(b) of the California Constitution, and the first amendment
of the United States Constitution. 0 2
Hallissy petitioned the court' of appeal for review of Judge
Spellberg's ruling. The petition was summarily denied,
although it was supported by amici curiae briefs. 03 Hallissy
was called to the witness stand in September 1987. Judge
Simons ordered her to answer questions about how she de-
cided to interview Sapp and what he said in the interview.
She replied, "I respectfully decline to answer.' 10 4 Judge
Simons held Hallissy in contempt of court. She was sentenced
to begin a jail term on November 4, 1987. Judge Simons' rul-
ing left Hallissy with the choice of either obeying the order to
testify, or seeking a remedy in habeas corpus. She immedi-
ately petitioned the California Supreme Court, seeking a stay
of the order. The court granted the petition and directed the
court of appeal to review the case.10 5 The court of appeal
heard arguments on March 2, 1988. On April 28, 1988 the
court vacated the contempt order and held that Sapp had not
100. Id. at 12-13.
101. Id. at 13.
102. Id
103. Amici curiae briefs were filed by: Newspaper Publishers Association, Chron-
icle Publishing Company, California Society of Newspaper Editors, Contra Costa
County Press Club, Northern Society of Professional Journalists, and San Francisco
Bay Guardian.
104. Bodovitz, Jail For Contra Costa Reporter, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 22, 1987,
at A3, col. 2.
105. See News Gathering on Trial, Santa Cruz Sentinel, Nov. 10, 1987, at A13, col.
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made the requisite showing to overcome the privilege." e
Defense counsel made three arguments in favor of com-
pelled disclosure. First, he argued that a defendant's right to a
fair trial outweighs first amendment rights and compels a
journalist with relevant and material evidence to testify.0 7 He
argued that the due process right of a defendant to present a
defense requires that he be. permitted to examine witnesses,
including reporters, who have relevant and material evidence
at a preliminary hearing. He noted that in criminal cases
courts have uniformly found that the public interest in law
enforcement creates a substantial need for disclosure. Where
competing constitutional interests exist, the court must weigh
each interest to determine which should prevail. 08 Second, he
argued that the California Constitution and California Evi-
dence Code provisions did not override a defendant's right to a
fair trial and, in fact, compelled Hallissy's testimony.10 9 Fi-
nally, defense counsel argued that the "clear and present dan-
ger" standard, advocated by Hallissy, was inapplicable. 110
Hallissy advanced three arguments pertaining to the scope
of the California shield law."' She argued that article 1, sec-
tion 2(b) of the California Constitution absolutely protects a
journalist against compelled disclosure. Second, she argued
that a journalist is entitled to the maximum protection against
compelled disclosure consistent with the sixth amendment.
Hallissy contended that a newsperson's privilege should only
be overcome on a showing of a clear and present danger that a
defendant's sixth amendment rights are in jeopardy." 2 Fi-
nally, she applied the three-part test enunciated by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Superior Court113 to the
facts of her case and concluded that she should not be com-
pelled to disclose the information sought." 4 In applying this
106. The Hallissy court vacated the contempt order against the reporter on proce-
dural grounds, but, "[i]n the interests of judicial economy and for the guidance of the
trial court .... "proceeded to reach the merits of the controversy. Hallssy, 200 Cal.
App. 3d at 1044, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
107. Brief for Real Party in Interest at 9, Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1038, 248
Cal. Rptr. at 635.
108. Id at 21.
109. Id at 25.
110. Id at 35.
111. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 32-36.
112. Id
113. 37 Cal. 3d 268, 280, 690 P.2d 625, 632 (1984).
114. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 32-36.
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test, she argued: (1) the unpublished material in controversy
did not go to the heart of the defendant's case; (2) it would not
affect the outcome; and (3) alternative sources existed for the
same information.115
The court issued a succinct opinion that vacated the con-
tempt order against Hallissy.116 The court credited the earlier
decision in Hammarley v. Superior Court "7 with defining the
"contours of the defendant's task" in seeking to overcome the
assertion of a shield privilege: the party seeking to avoid the
privilege must demonstrate that the evidence sought 1) is rele-
vant; 2) is necessary; 3) is unavailable from an alternate, less
intrusive source; and 4) has a reasonable possibility of being
exculpatory.1 1 8
Sapp was held to have met only the first of the four require-
ments.1 9 The court was satisfied that inconsistent statements
made by Sapp to Hallissy could have been used to attack
Sapp's credibility.120 However, the court noted that Sapp made
no attempt to show how this information was necessary to his
case. He therefore failed to meet the second Hammarley re-
quirement.12  The court went on to hold that Sapp had de-
stroyed any possibility of meeting the third and fourth
requirements by admitting that he had made similar state-
ments to persons other than Hallissy who could prove the fal-
sity of his confessions. 22
B. Recent History of the Shield Law in California
On its face, the information Hallissy was protecting did not
appear to be the type of information contemplated by the Cali-
fornia shield law: it was not confidential; 23 it did not entail a
source whose identity needed to be protected;124 and there was
no danger that disclosure would pose a risk of physical harm
to Hallissy, or directly jeopardize her ability to procure infor-
115. Id
116. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1046, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
117. 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979).
118. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1045-46, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 638 (citing Ham-
marley, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 614).
119. 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1046, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
120. Id
121. Id.
122. Id at 1042, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
123. Id
124. Id
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mation in the future. Yet, despite these facts, Hallissy's case
received national attention.x 5 She was officially commended
in a resolution at the National Convention of the Society of
Professional Journalists for her fortitude in the face of threats
of imprisonment. 26
The key to understanding Hallissy's position is recognizing
the significance of shield laws to the media. Newspeople ar-
gue there will be a chilling effect on news gathering if con-
tempt findings are upheld in cases such as Hallissy's. 27 They
argue that contempt orders against journalists flout the will of
Californians as expressed in their approval of Proposition 5, a
constitutional amendment that elevated California's shield law
to constitutional status. 28 Proposition 5 was approved by sev-
enty-three percent of California voters in 1980.11 Hallissy's
supporters point to this wide margin of voter approval as evi-
dence of the desire for strong shield laws. 3 ° Since the shield
law was the result of a favorable vote on a ballot initiative, it
is viewed by proponents as the highest expression of the will
of the people acting in their sovereign capacity as to matters of
state law.' 3 ' Despite this view, articles in the California Con-
stitution that conflict with federal constitutional rights have
been held unconstitutional. 3 2
The move to constitutionalize the shield law was generated
125. See Reporter Sentenced for Contempt Seeks Reinterpretation of Shield
Amendment, NEWS MEDIA & THE LAw, Winter 1988, at 43; Hallissy Avoids Jail Sen-
tence For Silence, NEWS MEDIA & THE LAw, Summer 1988, at 45.
126. Telephone interview with James Brooks, Editor of the Contra Costa County
Times (Feb. 23, 1989).
127. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9.
128. See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Review at 4, Hallissy v.
Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988).
129. See News Gathering Placed on Trial, supra note 105, at A-13, col. 1.
130. See supra note 128. The significance of the wide margin, however, is limited
by the fact that no arguments in opposition to the proposition were publicized. No
opposing arguments were submitted for printing in the official voter pamphlet
printed by the Secretary of State. Delaney v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1019,
1028, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60, 65 (1988), reh'g granted, 252 Cal. Rptr. 277, 762 P.2d 441
(1988). There was no mention in the pamphlet about the possibility that the shield
law might conflict with a defendant's right to a fair trial. California Ballot Pam-
phlet, Primary Election 19 (June 3, 1980) [hereinafter California Ballot Pamphlet].
131. See supra text accompanying note 73.
132. In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), the Supreme Court found a Cali-
fornia Proposition unconstitutional. Proposition 14 prohibited the state from deny-
ing property owners the right to use absolute discretion in declining to sell or rent
their property. Id. at 371. The provision was struck down as a violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
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by a perception that the California judiciary had eroded the
law in a series of decisions. 33 The Official Voter's Pamphlet
argument in favor of Proposition 5 noted that "[t]he free flow
of information to the public is one of the fundamental corner-
stones assuring freedom in America .... [T]hat flow is cur-
rently being threatened by actions of some members of the
California Judiciary."'134 The argument dramatized the plight
of journalists: "[t]o jail a journalist because he protected his
source is an assault not only on the press but on all Californi-
ans as well.' 135 The Hallissy decision illustrates that Proposi-
tion 5 may well have had its intended effect of curtailing
judicial interference with shield laws.
C. The Pre-Proposition 5 Cases
In four California appellate court decisions between 1971
and 1979, the court allowed an asserted shield immunity to be
overcome by another principle of law.36 The decisions in
these cases were the "actions by some members of the Judici-
ary' 13 7 credited by media advocates in the Voter's Pamphlet
with threatening the free flow of information in California.1'3
The case of Farr v. Superior Court39 has been called "part
of the catalytic process that alarmed the press and encouraged
congressional activity in the direction of testimonial privilege
legislation during 1972-1974. ' 1140 In Farr, a court of appeal re-
jected a reporter's assertion of shield immunity and held him
in contempt.'' The court reasoned that neither its authority
to control its officers and proceedings, nor the defendant's
right to a fair trial may be jeopardized by the assertion of the
shield law.42
William Farr, a reporter for the Los Angeles Herald Exam-
133. See Note, The Newsgatherer's Shield: Why Waste Space in the California
Constitution 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 527, 548 (1985) (authored by H. Kevane).
134. See California Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 130.
135. 1&
136. Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971); Rosato v.
Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975); CBS, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978); Hammarley v. Superior Court,
89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979).
137. See California Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 130.
138. Id.
139. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971).
140. M. VAN GERPEN, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND THE PRESs 22 (1979).
141. Farr, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 73, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
142. Id at 70-71, 73, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348-50.
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iner, covered the trial of the infamous Charles Manson and
his followers. Fearing that excessive publicity would surround
the trial, the trial judge issued an order prohibiting any attor-
ney, court employee, or witness from publicly divulging any
trial testimony. Despite the order, Farr sought and obtained a
written statement from a potential witness in the case. Two of
the six attorneys in the case also provided Farr with copies of
the same statement.143
When the trial judge learned of the leak, he conducted a
hearing to determine whether the violation of the order had
infringed on the defendant's right to a fair trial. He requested
that Farr disclose the names of the attorneys who had given
him the prohibited statement. Farr refused. The judge held
him in contempt and ordered that Farr be incarcerated until
he disclosed the names. Farr received a stay of the contempt
order pending his filing of a writ for appellate review."
Farr notified the trial judge prior to publishing an article
based on the statement. This permitted the judge to prevent
the sequestered jury from reading the story, which was pub-
lished under the headline "Liz, Sinatra on Slay List-Tate
Witness."'14
Seven months later, the same trial judge reopened the issue
after discovering that Farr was no longer an active journal-
ist. 46 He again requested that Farr disclose the names of the
attorneys who had violated the order.147 Farr declined, claim-
ing that to do so would "violate the ethics of my profession,
the law of California and my own conscience.' 14 The judge
ruled that since Farr was no longer a journalist, he was no
longer protected by the shield law.149
The judge stated that section 1070 of the California Evi-
dence Code did not immunize a reporter from a contempt cita-
tion when the reporter's refusal to comply with a subpoena
interfered with the court's ability to control its officers and
proceedings.'" Farr spent forty-eight days in jail for refusing
143. See M. VAN GERPEN, supra note 140, at 22.
144. Id. at 22-23.
145. Id.
146. I&
147. Id
148. IM
149. Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (1971).
150. Id. at 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
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to disclose his sources.151 He was released after a hearing in
the court of appeal, at which he convinced the presiding judge
that he would never make the requested disclosure. 52
In Rosato v. Superior Court, 153 the court of appeal based its
holding on the same two considerations that prevailed in Farr:
(1) a defendant's right to a fair trial, and (2) the need for the
court to control its own proceedings."M Rosato was similar to
Farr in that the purpose of the subpoena was to locate an in-
formation leak that threatened the defendant's right to a fair
trial. Joe Rosato and William Patterson were reporters for
the Fresno Bee covering a Fresno County grand jury investiga-
tion of political corruption.155
The defendants charged in the political corruption case had
moved for a court order to seal the grand jury testimony.15
The judge granted the motion and issued an Order re Publicity
sealing the testimony. 157 Despite the order, portions of the
grand jury testimony were subsequently published in the
Fresno Bee."s The court took testimony from Rosato, Patter-
son and two other Fresno Bee editors, known as the "Bee
Four," to determine who had leaked the testimony. 5 9 All four
cited the first amendment and California's shield law in refus-
ing to divulge the source of the grand jury testimony they had
published.
The "Bee Four" were held in contempt.'6 ° The court consid-
ered the scope of California Evidence Code section 1070 and
held that the contempt immunity provided therein was inap-
plicable where a newsperson had participated in or witnessed
criminal activity.' 6 1 The "Bee Four" served fifteen days at the
Fresno County Prison Farm. Their release came after "an ex-
hausting day with demonstrators surrounding the court
house.'1 62 Although the presiding judge clung to the principle
that the law has the right to everyman's evidence, he released
151. M. VAN GERPEN, supra note 140, at 23.
152. Id
153. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975).
154. Id at 220-22, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 446-48.
155. Id at 201, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 433-34.
156. I at 200, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
157. Id
158. Id at 202, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
159. Id, at 201-02, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 434-35.
160. Id. at 205, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
161. Id. at 219-22, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
162. M. VAN GERPEN, supra note 140, at 26.
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the "Bee Four." He stressed their infraction but ruled that
the fifteen days served would complete the sentence. In both
Farr and Rosato, a judge, rather than a prosecution or defense
attorney, sought to compel testimony. The holding in Rosato
inspired California Assemblyman Jerry Lewis to introduce a
legislative proposal to fortify the shield law.163 This proposal
led to the constitutionalization of the law in 1980.1"
In CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 61 the defendants sought to
compel the CBS television network to turn over unpublished
information. The information was in the form of outtakes
from a segment of the television program "Sixty Minutes."''
The segment showed three meetings between defendants and
undercover narcotics agents. 67 In return for the right to film
the segment, CBS had promised to keep the identity of the
agents confidential.168 When the agents testified that their
memories of the event would be refreshed by seeing the out-
takes, the defendants subpoenaed the outtakes on the ground
that they were essential to their defense.169
CBS moved to quash the subpoena, citing California Evi-
dence Code section 1070, the federal and California Constitu-
tions, and the defendants' failure to show good cause.7 At
the hearing on this motion, the undercover agents voluntarily
revealed their identities.17' The motion was denied, and CBS
appealed the order to produce the outtakes. 2
The appellate court held that because the identities of the
agents had already been revealed, CBS was not acting to pro-
tect the confidentiality of a source, and had, therefore, lost the
protection of California Evidence Code section 1070.'17 Weigh-
ing the constitutional right of the press to gather news against
the defendant's right to a fair trial, the court held that a crimi-
nal defendant must demonstrate only a "reasonable possibility
that evidence sought to be discovered might result in his exon-
163. Assem. Const. Amend. No. 4, Stats. 1978 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) res. ch. 77, pp.
4819-20.
164. CAL. CONST. art I, § 2(b).
165. 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978).
166. Id. at 247, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
167. IdM at 246, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 423-24.
168. Id at 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
169. Id. at 248, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
170. Id at 246, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
171. I& at 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
172. See id, at 247, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
173. I& at 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
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eration" to override the newsperson's privilege. 74 The appel-
late court then ruled that a trial court must examine
subpoenaed materials in camera to identify crucial evidence.
175
CBS was later interpreted as creating an exception to Califor-
nia Evidence Code section 1070 where the identity of a confi-
dential source has been revealed.
17
The final appellate decision prior to constitutionalization of
the shield law was Hammarley v. Superior Court.7 7 John
Hammarley, a reporter for the Sacramento Union, wrote a se-
ries of articles on a crime organization he referred to as the
"Mexican Mafia.'1 7 8 His primary source for the articles was
Edward Gonzalez, a former member of the organization. 79
Gonzalez had been granted prosecutorial immunity in return
for his testimony against several defendants charged with
murder. Gonzalez had assumed a new identity and was under
police protection in another state. 80 Hammarley possessed
tape recordings, notes, and summaries of the interviews he
had conducted with Gonzalez.' 8 '
The murder defendants served Hammarley with a subpoena
duces tecum requesting him to appear as their witness.8 2 The
subpoena ordered him to produce all evidence of his inter-
views with Gonzalez.8 3 Gonzalez was an eyewitness and had
confessed to participation in the murder with which defend-
ants were charged. He also served as the prosecution's pri-
mary witness.18
4
In subpoenaing Hammarley's evidence, the defendants
sought to impeach Gonzalez's testimony by comparing it with
inconsistent statements that appeared in the Sacramento
Union articles.18 5 Hammarley moved to quash the subpoena,
but the trial court ordered him to produce the subpoenaed
materials at an in camera hearing.'"8 The stated purpose of
174. Id, at 251, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
175. Id at 253, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
176. Sipos, supra note 7, at 223.
177. 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979).
178. Id at 392, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 609-10.
179. Id. at 393, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id
184. Id.
185. Id at 400, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
186. Id. at 394, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
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the hearing was to evaluate the value of the materials to the
defendants and to prevent the disclosure of Gonzalez's where-
abouts or new identity."8 7 When Hammarley refused to attend
the in camera hearing, he was cited for contempt and commit-
ted to county jail.' The commitment order was stayed pend-
ing appellate review of the case.
The court of appeal suggested that no shield privilege is ab-
solute.'89 Judge Puglia noted:
[T]he proposition that a privilege, even one grounded in the
Constitution, is entitled to absolute primacy is called into
question by United States v. Nixon. There, the Supreme
Court acknowledged the constitutional derivation of the Pres-
ident's claim of executive privilege [citation omitted], but held
that under the circumstances the privilege must yield to the
legitimate demands of the criminal justice system for every-
man's evidence.'90
Judge Puglia concluded that a "state may not abridge the
right to a fair trial by 'denying the accused access to all evi-
dence that could throw light on issues in the case.' ""9" Thejudge held that the reporter's asserted privilege was sub-
ordinate to the defendant's demonstrated need for subpoenaed
materials. 92
Judge Puglia applied a three-part test in reaching his deci-
sion. First, a defendant seeking to overcome a claim of privi-
lege must demonstrate that the evidence sought is relevant
and necessary to his or her case. Second, the defendant must
demonstrate that the evidence sought is not available from an
alternative source "less intrusive upon the privilege.' 91 3
Third, the defendant must show a reasonable possibility that
the evidence sought may result in exoneration.'
187. Id,
188. I at 395, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
189. Id, at 401, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
190. IM
191. Id at 401-02, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16 (quoting People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566,
305 P.2d 1 (1956)).
192. Id at 402, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
193. Id at 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
194. The facts in Hammarley bear several similarities to those in Hallissy v. Supe-
rior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988), discussed supra notes 85-
122 and accompanying text. In both cases, compelled disclosure from a reporter was
sought by a defendant trying to disclose inconsistencies in the statements of a wit-
ness. Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 608; Hallissy, 200 Cal.
App. 3d at 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 635. The defendants in both cases were charged
with serious crimes. Also, in both cases the party seeking compelled disclosure as-
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The California Constitution provides:
A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with
or employed upon a newspaper, magazine or other periodical
publication, or by a press association or wire service, or any
person who has been so connected or employed, shall not be
adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legislative, or administra-
tive body, or any other body having the power to issue subpoe-
nas, for refusing to disclose the source of any information
procured while so connected or employed for publication, or
for refusing to disclose any unpublished information obtained
or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of informa-
tion for communication to the public.
195
This language is virtually identical to the language of Evi-
dence Code section 1070.196 As a result of this nearly identical
wording, constitutionalization did little more than fuel the fire
on both sides of the shield law argument.197 Those who
viewed California Evidence Code section 1070 as a "privilege"
felt constitutionalization made the privilege absolute. Those
who viewed section 1070 as a mere immunity felt constitution-
alization would provide "no more of a privilege .... ,,198
D. Criminal vs. Civil Trials
The pre-Proposition 5 decisions that inspired constitutional-
ization of the shield law were all criminal cases. In the eight
years following constitutionalization, Hallissy v. Superior
Court'9 9 was the first criminal case in which the law was sub-
ject to appellate review. Prior to that decision, the constitu-
tional shield law was tested only in civil cases. The civil cases
explicitly expressed the view that the law's protection carries
serted that the constitutional right to a fair trial pierced the California reporter's
shield. Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 614; Brief for Real Party
in Interest at 46, Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988).
Because Hammarley was decided prior to the constitutionalization of California
Evidence Code section 1070, the judge was weighing provisions in the United States
Constitution against a California statute. In Hallissy, the same federal provisions
were up against a state constitutional right.
195. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2(b).
196. Where the California Constitution reads "shall not be adjudged in con-
tempt," section 1070 reads "cannot be adjudged in contempt." Id; CAL. EvID. CODE
§ 1070 (West 1988) (emphasis added). This is the only difference.
197. See Note, supra note 133, at 545-48.
198. KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 381-82, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211, 215
(1982).
199. 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988).
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less weight in criminal trials than in civil trials.2 0° In 1982, the
court of appeal heard the case of KSDO v. Superior Court,201
in which the plaintiff alleged both libel and civil rights claims.
The court noted that in criminal cases, the public interest in
law enforcement creates a "substantial public need for disclo-
sure." 20 2 In civil cases, by contrast, stronger first amendment
protection exists because the furtherance of the interest in
public disclosure is less compelling.2 0 3
In 1984, a court of appeal, in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Su-
perior Court,2°4 reinforced the CBS holding that a criminal de-
fendant's right to discovery exists where the discovery sought
demonstrates a "reasonable possibility" of exoneration.20 The
court noted that civil litigants have no constitutional right to
unrestricted discovery of relevant information.20
In Mitchell v. Superior Court, 2 7 the California Supreme
Court stated that "[i]n criminal proceedings, both the interest
of the state in law enforcement, recognized as a compelling
interest in Branzburg v. Hayes208 and the interest of the de-
fendant in discovering exonerating evidence outweigh any in-
terest asserted in ordinary civil litigation."2 o
The holdings in these recent cases have not eliminated the
shield law's applicability to criminal cases. Any party seeking
to overcome a newsperson's shield must still meet a heavy
burden of proof. After Hammarley v. Superior Court, a party
seeking to overcome a privilege must prove that the evidence
sought is relevant and necessary to the case, and that it is un-
available from an alternate, "less intrusive" source.210  Fur-
ther, a criminal defendant must show a reasonable possibility
that the evidence sought may result in exoneration.21 '
200. See Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 278, 690 P.2d 625, 631, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 152, 158 (1984); KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 385, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211, 217 (1982).
201. 136 Cal. App. 3d at 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
202. I& at 385, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
203. Id
204. 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1984).
205. Id. at 26, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 215. See also CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal.
App. 3d 241, 251, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421, 427 (1978); People v. Borunda, 11 Cal. 3d 523,
527, 522 P.2d 1, 3, 113 Cal. Rptr. 825, 828 (1974).
206. Playboy, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 30, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
207. 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1984).
208. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
209. Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 278, 690 P.2d at 631, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
210. 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608, 618 (1979).
211. Playboy, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 26-27, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 215 (citing CBS, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 253, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421, 427 (1978)).
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The California Supreme Court applied a slightly different
test in Mitchell.212 Although Mitchell was a civil case, its rea-
soning is instructive. The court held that a party seeking to
overcome a newsperson's shield must prevail in the balancing
of five factors: (1) the nature of the proceeding (civil or crimi-
nal); (2) the status of the newsperson (party or non-party); (3)
the availability/exhaustion of alternative sources of informa-
tion; (4) the relevancy or relationship of the information
sought to the heart of the claim; and (5) the importance of
protecting confidentiality.21
3
IV
Current Conflicts
A. The Privilege Upheld
Media advocates cite factors other than protection of sources
in support of a newsperson's privilege. They contend that sub-
poenas should not be used as "fishing expeditions" by lazy liti-
gants21 4 and cite the danger of subpoenas being used to make
journalists function as an investigative arm of government. 5
In light of these concerns, courts have upheld the assertion of
a shield law privilege where the scope of the information
sought is overbroad or unlikely to produce useful evidence. 6
In United States v. Domina, 7 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a
trial court's decision to quash a subpoena directed at the San
Jose Mercury News seeking all information from its secret wit-
ness program on the ground that the subpoena was too
broadly drawn.218
In United States v. Cuthbertson, 9 the Third Circuit allowed
CBS to withhold certain subpoenaed materials because the
court found they contained only a "mere hope" of producing
relevant evidence and pertained to non-witnesses.22 ° Cuthbert-
son also involved the CBS News program "Sixty Minutes." At
212. 37 Cal. 3d at 279-84, 690 P.2d at 632-35, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 155-62.
213. Id.; KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 86 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1982).
214. See K.M. GALVIN, MEDIA LAW: A LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR THE WORKING
JOURNALIST 126 (1984).
215. See M. VAN GERPEN, supra note 140, at 27.
216. See, e.g., United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1986).
217. Id
218. Id. at 1372.
219. 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1056 (1981).
220. Id at 144.
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issue was a documentary titled "From Burgers to Bank-
ruptcy," which dealt with alleged fraud in a franchise chain of
Wild Bill's Family Restaurants. Executives of the chain were
subsequently indicted on fraud and conspiracy charges. They
subpoenaed CBS to procure materials from the documentary,
including notes, video tapes, and audio tapes.2 2 1 The Third
Circuit upheld a separate contempt citation against CBS for
refusing to produce the requested materials for in camera re-
view. The court noted that a defendant's sixth amendment
right to a fair trial is an important factor to be weighed in
cases where compelled discovery is sought.22
In cases upholding reporters' claims of privilege, state courts
have cited the importance of preserving the media's ability to
question and investigate government. For example, in In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Ridenhour),22 s  the Louisiana
Supreme Court vacated a ruling requiring a reporter to an-
swer questions on his sources for a series of articles on govern-
ment corruption.224 The court relied on Branzburg v. Hayes225
in holding that a lower court failed to properly balance the
interests at stake, and noted that additional weight should be
given to a reporter's interest where the information at issue
concerns investigation or criticism of government. 26
Courts are likely to uphold shield laws where alternate
sources of the information at issue are available. In Hallissy v.
Superior Court, the court applied the four-part Hammarley v.
Superior Court test to uphold the assertion of a shield privi-
lege against a defendant's sixth amendment claim.227 The Hal-
lissy court concluded that the defendant failed to meet his
burden of proving that the evidence he sought bore a "reason-
able possibility" of exonerating him.228 The court noted that
"[n]ot only has he not met that burden he has proved the
221. Id. at 147.
222. Id.
223. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ridenhour), 520 So. 2d 372 (La. 1988).
224. Id. at 376. 
1
225. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). All four Branzburg opinions recognized the competing
interests that arise when reporters are subpoenaed. See supra notes 43-47 and ac-
companying text.
226. Grand Jury Proceedings (Ridenhour), 520 So. 2d at 376.
227. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
228. Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 1046, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635, 639
(1988).
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opposite: There are numerous non-privileged sources of ap-
parently fungible inconsistent statements ....,2 9
B. Qualified Immunity in California
There has been considerable argument over whether Cali-
fornia's shield law creates an evidentiary privilege or merely
an immunity from sanctions for contempt.230 Proponents of
media interests contend that California's shield law gives
news-people an absolute, unqualified privilege. They contend
that the history preceding the enactment of article 1, section
2(b) of the California Constitution and case law interpreting
California Evidence Code section 1070 support this view.31
However, a review of the legislative intent of the drafters of
the California Evidence Code and several recent California ap-
pellate court decisions support a contrary view.
When the California legislature enacted Evidence Code sec-
tion 1070, the Assembly Judiciary Committee specifically de-
clined to create a privilege: "[i]t should be noted that section
1070, like the existing law, provides an immunity from being
adjudged in contempt. It does not create a privilege. "232
In cases interpreting the California Evidence Code and Cali-
fornia Constitution, the shield law has consistently been de-
scribed as providing immunity from contempt, not an absolute
privilege.23 3 The court in KSDO v. Superior Court emphati-
cally stated:
The description "shield law" conjures up visions of broad
protection and sweeping privilege. The California shield law,
however, is unique in that it affords only limited protection.
It does not create a privilege for newspersons, rather it
provides an immunity from being adjudged in contempt. This
basic distinction has been misstated and apparently mis-
229. ML
230. See Sipos, supra note 7.
231. See supra section III. See also Brief for Amici Curiae filed by the Chronicle
Publishing Co. at 3-4, Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 635 (1988).
232. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1966) (Comment, Assembly Committee on Ju-
diciary). See also Comment, Newsmen's Immunity Needs a Shot in the Arm, 11
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 56 (1970).
233. Dalitz v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 168 Cal. App. 3d 468, 479-80, 214 Cal. Rptr.
254, 261 (1985); KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1982).
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understood by members of the news media and our courts as
well."s
The Hallissy court held that "[b]ecause the shield law does
not preclude the imposition of sanctions other than contempt,
it confers absolute immunity only when a nonparty witness re-
fuses to disclose covered information.' ' 23 5 By contrast, a party
to litigation is subject to a variety of sanctions for disobeying a
court order to disclose evidence, including entry of a judgment
against him or her.236
C. The In Camera Hearing
The California shield law does not provide an absolute privi-
lege, and thus must be balanced against the need for disclo-
sure of the information sought. This need is particularly acute
in criminal proceedings, where a defendant's right to a fair
trial is constitutionally protected. California Evidence Code
section 915 governs disclosure of privileged information.
Where a court determines there are no other feasible means to
rule on the validity of a privilege claim, it has discretion to
hold an in camera hearing.3 7
At an in camera hearing, a judge may require that the per-
son from whom disclosure is sought disclose the information
in chambers, out of the presence of all other persons. If the
judge determines that the disputed information falls within
the scope of a privilege, it can never be disclosed without the
consent of the party asserting the privilege.3 8
In CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court,2 9 a California Court of Ap-
peal remanded the case so that the scope of a discovery order
could be narrowed. The court held that the trial court was
234. KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 379-80, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
235. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1045, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 638. Contra Delaney v.
Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 1029-30, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60, 66-69 (1988) (a dif-
ferent branch of the California Court of Appeal held the shield privilege inapplica-
ble when a reporter is an eyewitness to a public event); Delaney, 202 Cal. App. 3d at
1031, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 70 (Spencer, J., dissenting) (noting that yet another branch of
the California Court of Appeal in New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 202 Cal.
App. 3d 503, 248 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1988), did not distinguish eyewitness testimony re-
garding public events from unpublished information covered by the shield law).
236. See Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1045, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 639 (quoting Mitchell
v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 274, 690 P.2d 625, 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 155
(1984)).
237. CAL. EVID. CODE § 915(a), (b) (West Supp. 1988).
238. I& at § 915(b).
239. 85 Cal. App. 3d 249, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978).
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under a duty both to protect the defendant's right to a fair
trial and to interfere as little as possible with CBS's first
amendment rights. The court held that this process required,
at a minimum, that the court examine the subpoenaed CBS
materials at an in camera hearing.240
The trial court in Hammarley v. Superior Court sought to
examine subpoenaed materials at an in camera hearing.141
-The court denied a reporter's motion to quash the subpoena
duces tecum ordering him to produce the materials at the
hearing. The materials were sought by a murder defendant
who made a "substantial showing" that the reporter had rele-
vant evidence from which the bias of an eyewitness could be
disclosed. It was clear that no alternative source of the evi-
dence was available. No confidential source needed protection.
On review, the court of appeal held that the trial court prop-
erly found that the reporter had made no factual showing that
the privilege should prevail over the defendant's right to a fair
trial.242
These holdings demonstrate the practicality of the in cam-
era hearing in determining whether the importance of the evi-
dence sought by a criminal defendant outweighs an asserted
privilege. A California Court of Appeal recently remanded a
criminal case for an in camera hearing to determine whether
the defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial overcame
the assertion of a psychotherapist-patient privilege." 3 The
court noted that there was no way to balance the competing
rights without viewing the disputed tape.244
Conclusion
The California Supreme Court's opinion in Mitchell v. Supe-
rior Court represents the prevailing method for balancing an
asserted shield privilege against the need for disclosure of all
relevant evidence.245 Courts must apply additional factors in
criminal cases.246 An application of these factors to the facts
240. Id. at 252-53, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 427-28.
241. 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979).
242. Id,
243. Rubio v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1343, 249 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1988).
244. Id. at 1350, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
245. 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1984).
246. Id. See also KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1982).
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of Hallissy v. Superior Court247 should have yielded a finding
in favor of compelled disclosure.
The nature of the proceeding in Hallissy was exceedingly
grave. The defendant could have been sentenced to death if
found guilty. There was a strong need for full disclosure of all
relevant evidence. The defendant had no alternative source
for the information he sought. Only Hallissy recorded the in-
terview, which had taken place nearly two years earlier.
The information sought was highly relevant to the defense
in that its absence eroded the defendant's credibility as a wit-
ness. Defense counsel contended that the defendant's own
statements formed the only basis for the special circumstances
allegation. Defense counsel believed he would have been able
to refute that basis by comparing and contrasting the details
and substance of statements the defendant made at different
times.
There was no need to protect the confidentiality of a source
in Hallissy, because the party seeking disclosure was also the
source of the information. The information sought by the de-
fendant bore a "reasonable possibility" of exonerating him of
at least one of the special circumstances with which he was
charged.2 s Where this possibility exists, the defendant's inter-
est in discovery has been held to outweigh interests asserted in
ordinary civil litigation.249
Hallissy was a death penalty case. Courts have long held
that the finality of the death penalty makes it quantitatively
different from any sentence of imprisonment, however long.25°
Death penalty defendants are entitled to special protections to
avoid any possibility of error.25 ' If there is a "reasonable
doubt" as to whether a special circumstances allegation is true,
the defendant is entitled to a finding that it is not.252
In overruling the municipal court quash order, the superior
court in Hallissy noted that it would be a "travesty" to accord
the first amendment the protection sought in a death penalty
247. 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988).
248. Playboy Enterprises v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 26, 201 Cal. Rptr.
207, 216-17 (1984).
249. Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 278, 690 P.2d at 631, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
250. People v. Zimmerman, 36 Cal. 3d 154, 179, 680 P.2d 776, 778, 202 Cal. Rptr.
826, 828 (1984).
251. Id
252. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(b) (Deering 1985). See also People v. Frierson, 25
Cal. 3d 142, 179, 599 P.2d 587, 604, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 302 (1979).
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case for disclosure of information given by the very person
who is seeking its disclosure.253
The defendant in Hallissy presented a strong argument in
favor of allowing him to discover the information he sought.
His inability to do so and the vehemence of the opposition he
met with indicate a need for further clarification of the stan-
dards that govern the application of California's shield law.
Where confidentiality is at issue, information should be pro-
tected, where possible, without interfering with a criminal de-
fendant's right to a fair trial. This goal can be met through
exercise of the power of a court to issue protective orders and
to conduct in camera hearings.
Evidence scholar John Henry Wigmore recognized that it
has been a fundamental maxim for more than three centuries
that the public has a right to every man's evidence:
When we come to examine the various claims of exemption,
we start with the primary assumption that there is a general
duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving and that
any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional,
being so many derogations from a positive general rule.2M
First amendment principles should operate to uphold the as-
sertion of the privilege in civil cases. Where there is no need
to maintain confidentiality of a source or material, or where
the need for disclosure is substantial, an asserted privilege
should yield to the established rule that the state has a right
to every person's evidence.
253. Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 1042, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635, 636
(1988).
254. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (1961).
